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Floodlight quantum key distribution (FL-QKD) is a radically different QKD paradigm that can
achieve Gbit/s secret-key rates over metropolitan area distances without multiplexing [Phys. Rev. A
94, 012322 (2016)]. It is a two-way protocol that transmits many photons per bit duration and
employs a high-gain optical amplifier, neither of which can be utilized by existing QKD protocols,
to mitigate channel loss. FL-QKD uses an optical bandwidth that is substantially larger than the
modulation rate and performs decoding with a unique broadband homodyne receiver. Essential to
FL-QKD is Alice’s injection of photons from a photon-pair source—in addition to the light used for
key generation—into the light she sends to Bob. This injection enables Alice and Bob to quantify
Eve’s intrusion and thus secure FL-QKD against collective attacks. Our proof-of-concept experiment
included 10 dB propagation loss—equivalent to 50 km of low-loss fiber—and achieved a 55 Mbit/s
secret-key rate (SKR) for a 100 Mbit/s modulation rate, as compared to the state-of-the-art system’s
1 Mbit/s SKR for a 1 Gbit/s modulation rate [Opt. Express 21, 24550–24565 (2013)], representing
∼500-fold and ∼50-fold improvements in secret-key efficiency (SKE) (bits per channel use) and SKR
(bits per second), respectively.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–7] enables two re-
mote users (Alice and Bob) to create a shared secret key
with unconditional security. Using that key as a one-
time pad, they can then communicate with information-
theoretic security. Unfortunately, propagation loss in-
curred in long-distance transmission has kept the secret-
key rates (SKRs) of state-of-the-art QKD systems far
below the Gbit/s rates needed for their widespread de-
ployment. The universal upper limit on a QKD system’s
secret-key rate [8–10] is − log2(1 − κ) bits per optical
mode [9], where κ is the channel transmissivity. A 50 km
low-loss fiber has κ = 0.1, implying a 0.15 bit/mode
rate limit. Continuous-variable QKD protocols neces-
sarily operate with one optical mode per channel use
[6, 11, 12], while decoy-state BB84 (the predominant
discrete-variable QKD protocol) takes no advantage of
multiple modes per channel use [4, 5, 7, 13–16]. Hence
− log2(1−κ) is their ultimate secret-key efficiency (SKE)
in bits per channel use. High-dimensional QKD sys-
tems employ multiple modes per channel use [17–23],
but their secret-key rates do not exceed that of ideal
decoy-state BB84. State-of-the-art QKD implementa-
tions, however, have SKEs well below this limit, e.g.,
the 1 Mbit/s, 50-km-fiber demonstration from Refs. [4, 5]
realized 10−3 bits per channel use. Given current band-
width limitations on electronics, such low SKEs preclude
existing QKD protocols from attaining Gbit/s SKRs over
metropolitan-area distances unless massive amounts of
wavelength-division multiplexing—with their attendant
complexity and cost—are employed.
In this Letter we experimentally validate a new QKD
framework, called floodlight QKD (FL-QKD) [24], that
is capable of Gbit/s SKRs over metropolitan-area dis-
tances. FL-QKD transmits many photons per bit dura-
tion and uses a high-gain optical amplifier, neither of
which can be utilized by existing QKD protocols, to
mitigate channel loss. Transmitting many photons per
bit duration without compromising security is possible
because FL-QKD utilizes an optical bandwidth that is
much greater than its modulation rate. Furthermore, FL-
QKD employs a unique broadband homodyne receiver
that effectively leverages optical bandwidth without re-
sorting to multiplexing.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of FL-QKD. FL-QKD
is a two-way multi-mode protocol in which, unlike pre-
vious two-way protocols [25–31], Alice uses an amplified
spontaneous emission (ASE) source whose optical band-
width W is much greater than the modulation rate R.
Thus in one channel use (one T = 1/R bit duration) Al-
ice’s ASE source emits M = WT  1 temporal modes
of duration 1/W .
FL-QKD has three principal steps. First, Alice sends a
low-brightness (photons/mode  1) portion of her ASE
light to Bob, which is completely correlated with the
high-brightness (photons/mode 1) remainder that she
retains for use as her homodyne receiver’s local oscillator
(LO). Low-brightness light cannot be amplified or cloned
with good fidelity, while the M  1 modes per bit du-
ration permits FL-QKD to mitigate loss in the Alice-to-
Bob channel, so that on average Bob receives at least one
photon per bit duration. Second, Bob uses binary phase-
shift keying (BPSK) to encode a bit sequence onto the
light he received from Alice. He then amplifies the mod-
ulated light with a high-gain amplifier to overcome the
return-path propagation loss while adding spontaneous
emission noise. Third, Alice receives the light returned
from Bob and decodes his bit sequence by broadband ho-
modyne reception after delaying her LO by that of the
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FIG. 1: (color online) Schematic of FL-QKD under Eve’s op-
timum collective attack realized as an SPDC-injection attack.
Photons generated by Alice’s broadband source are marked
by thin dotted lines (black); photons generated by Alice’s
photon-pair source are marked by thin solid lines (green);
photons generated by Eve’s entanglement source are marked
by thin dashed lines (red); photons emitted by Bob’s ampli-
fier are marked by thick lines (blue). The channel monitoring
apparatus consists of the three single-photon detectors placed
in red boxes. Note that at Bob’s single-photon detector only
the photons originating from Alice’s photon-pair source (solid
line) are coincident with Alice’s idler photons, whereas the
photons injected by Eve (dashed line) only contribute to the
noise background. As such, Eve’s injection ratio fE can be
determined by measuring the coincidences versus singles rates
at Alice and Bob’s single-photon detectors.
Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice roundtrip.
An essential part of FL-QKD is Alice and Bob’s moni-
toring of their quantum channel to defeat Eve’s optimum
collective attack [24]. Alice combines the low-brightness
ASE light she is sending to Bob with the signal out-
put from a continuous-wave (cw) spontaneous paramet-
ric down-converter (SPDC) and taps a small fraction of
the combined ASE-SPDC light for coincidence detection
with the SPDC’s idler output prior to sending the rest
of that light to Bob. Her singles and signal-idler coin-
cidence measurements tell her the SPDC fraction in her
combined ASE-SPDC light. Similarly, Bob taps a small
fraction of the light he receives for singles measurements
and for coincidence measurements with Alice’s idler that
tell him the fraction of his received light which originated
from the SPDC. Bob’s tap measurements are normalized
relative to Alice’s tap measurements to yield fE , a pa-
rameter that quantifies Eve’s intrusion on the Alice-to-
Bob quantum channel:
fE = 1− (CIB − C˜IB)/SB
(CIA − C˜IA)/SA
. (1)
Here, CIB (CIA) is the time-aligned coincidence rate of
Bob’s (Alice’s) tap, C˜IB (C˜IA) is the time-shifted coinci-
dence rate of Bob’s (Alice’s) tap that measures accidental
coincidences, and SB (SA) is the singles rate of Bob’s (Al-
ice’s) tap. This fE measurement is calibration free [24],
i.e., it is independent of channel loss, detector efficiencies,
and source brightness.
We emphasize that FL-QKD is fundamentally a multi-
mode protocol (M  1) that makes it feasible to achieve
much higher SKE and SKR than existing QKD proto-
cols by utilizing an ASE source whose optical bandwidth
greatly exceeds the modulation rate. Operationally, how-
ever, this large bandwidth disparity does not require
wavelength-division multiplexing, as is the case in clas-
sical communication. Instead, a broadband homodyne
receiver whose electrical bandwidth equals the modula-
tion rate suffices. Moreover, Bob’s optical amplifier, at
the cost of a modest reduction in each mode’s signal-to-
noise ratio, compensates return-path loss and detector
inefficiency. It also adds noise such that high-efficiency,
shot-noise limited detection is not necessary, unlike the
case for continuous-variable QKD [3, 11, 12].
In Ref. [24] we showed that Eve’s optimum collective
attack is the SPDC-injection attack [32] shown in Fig. 1,
for which fE equals the fraction of light entering Bob’s
terminal that came from Eve. The collective-attack se-
curity analysis in Ref. [24] granted Eve all of the return
light and an optimum collective measurement for decod-
ing Bob’s bit sequence. A lower bound on Alice and
Bob’s information-rate advantage against the optimum
collective attack can be obtained via
∆RLBAB =
[
βIAB − χUBEB(fE)
]
R, (2)
where IAB is Alice and Bob’s Shannon information, β is
their reconciliation efficiency, and χUBEB(fE) is an upper
bound on Eve’s Holevo information when her injection
fraction is fE . In Eve’s passive attack (no light injec-
tion) [25], her Holevo-information bound, χUBEB(0), can
be determined prior to communication. Then, because
Alice decodes all the bits sent by Bob, they can perform
direct secure communication by Bob’s using codes devel-
oped for wiretap channels to send a message to Alice with
sematic-security protection [33]. However, when Eve in-
jects light into Bob (fE > 0), her Holevo-information
bound, χUBEB(fE), can only be determined after channel
monitoring. In this case, Alice and Bob can only per-
form key distribution and Bob must therefore transmit a
random bit sequence.
Figure 2 shows our experimental setup, which was de-
signed to realize two main goals: demonstrating high-
SKR FL-QKD operation; and confirming the feasibility
of coincidence-based measurement of Eve’s injection frac-
tion, fE , down to values such that the upper bound on
her Holevo information rate is severely restricted. Using
our existing equipment we chose a moderate modulation
rate of 100 Mbit/s, with the understanding that it can
be easily scaled to ∼10-Gbit/s rates with commercially
available components.
Alice uses an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) fol-
lowed by a 18-nm (W = 2.2 THz) optical filter centered
at 1550 nm to produce broadband ASE light. A low-
brightness portion of the ASE is tapped for transmission
3FIG. 2: (color online) FL-QKD’s experimental implementation. BPSK: binary phase-shift keying; CWDM: coarse wavelength-
division multiplexer; EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; Tap: beam splitter. Photon-pair source is a cw SPDC.
to Bob, while the remainder is stored in a fiber delay
loop to serve as the LO for homodyne reception in the
decoding step. The SPDC light is generated in a MgO-
doped periodically-poled lithium niobate (PPLN) crys-
tal cw-pumped at 780 nm. The idler arm is detected
by a WSi superconducting nanowire single-photon de-
tector (SNSPD) immediately after its production. The
signal arm of the SPDC, serving as the channel-monitor
probe, is mixed with the ASE light using a 98/2 beam
splitter. Before Alice sends the ASE-SPDC light to Bob,
she taps and directs a small portion (< 0.1%) of it to a
WSi SNSPD for coincidence measurement with the idler.
We insert a 10 dB optical attenuator in the Alice-to-Bob
channel to simulate the channel loss of a 50 km fiber link.
Upon receiving the signal, Bob encodes messages using a
phase modulator that takes the pseudo-random data gen-
erated from a bit-error rate (BER) tester and imparts a
100 Mbit/s BPSK modulation. He then taps and sends a
small portion (< 0.1%) of the modulated light to a WSi
SNSPD for coincidence measurement with the idler. An
EDFA amplifies the rest of the signal and masks it with
strong ASE noise. At Alice’s receiver, she combines the
returned signal and her stored and delay-matched LO to
perform a broadband homodyne measurement to retrieve
Bob’s message (See Ref. [32] for more details).
To estimate Alice and Bob’s Shannon information,
BER measurements were taken at different source bright-
ness levels, as plotted in Fig. 3, showing good agreement
between theory and experiment. At all values of Alice’s
transmitted source brightness NS = PPB/WT , where
PPB is her mean number of transmitted photons per bit
duration, Alice’s BER is far below the quantum Cher-
noff bound on Eve’s BER for her optimum passive in-
dividual attack [25]. Experimental instabilities, such as
mechanical vibrations, thermal fluctuations, and polar-
ization drifts, cause the BER deviate from theory at a
level of ∼ 1 × 10−5, which has no effect on the SKRs.
The inset of Fig. 3 overlays 50 bits of the homodyne
receiver’s real-time output on Bob’s scaled modulated
message waveform, showing high signal-to-noise ratio for
message decoding. Note that the homodyne measure-
ment noise was dominated by the ASE of Bob’s amplifier,
which was ∼20 dB above the shot-noise level.
We simulated Eve’s SPDC-injection attack by feeding
broadband light into Bob’s terminal via a beam split-
ter. Figure 4 illustrates FL-QKD’s ability to detect in-
trusion with coincidence-data histogram plots from Al-
ice and Bob’s monitors, both referenced to the arrival
time of the idler photons. Here, the histograms of Al-
ice’s reference tap, Bob’s tap without Eve’s light injection
(fE = 0), and Bob’s tap with Eve replacing Alice’s light
with her own (fE = 1) correspond to the top (blue), bot-
tom (red), and middle (green) curves, respectively. Note
the absence of a coincidence peak for Bob’s tap when
fE = 1. To demonstrate the effectiveness of Alice and
Bob’s channel monitoring, we compare the measured fE
value, via Eq. (1), with Eve’s actual fE value, as deter-
mined by direct power measurements of Alice’s and Eve’s
light entering Bob’s terminal. The inset in Fig. 4 shows
excellent agreement between the measured and actual fE
values.
To estimate the SKR, we turned off Eve’s injection and
measured fE = (0.07±0.2)% from the channel monitors.
After adding one standard deviation of measurement un-
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FIG. 2: Alice’s BER versus her mean number of transmit-
ted photons per bit duration for W = 2.0THz source band-
width and R = 100Mbit/s modulation over a channel with
10 dB loss. Red circles: experimentally measured BER with
error bars indicating ±1 standard deviation of 10 consecutive
measurements. Red curve: BER theory taking into account
all measured experimental imperfections (detailed in Methods
and Supplementary Information). Dashed green curve: quan-
tum Chernoff bound on Eve’s BER for her optimal passive
individual attack. Inset: 50 bits of homodyne-receiver’s out-
put (blue) versus Bob’s modulated waveform (red) at a BER
level of 10−4, clearly showing the high signal-to-noise ratio of
Alice’s homodyne receiver.
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by direct power measurements of Alice and Eve’s light
entering Bob’s terminal. The inset in Fig. 3 shows ex-
cellent agreement between the measured and actual fE
values.
To estimate the SKR, we shut down the active injec-
tion and measured fE = (0.07± 0.2)% from the channel
monitors. After adding one standard deviation of mea-
surement uncertainty (other confidence levels are in Sup-
plementary Information), we used fUBE = 0.27% as an
upper bound on Eve’s injection fraction. We evaluated
Alice and Bob’s Shannon information from the BERmea-
surements, and Eve’s Holevo-information upper bound
χUBE (f
UB
E ) for her optimum collective Gaussian attack,
and χUBE (0) for her passive attack (see Methods and Sup-
plementary Information). In this SKR estimation, we
employed a β = 94% reconciliation efficiency [24]. For
a passive attack with our 100Mbit/s modulation rate,
we estimated a peak direct secure-communication effi-
ciency of 0.66bits per channel use, after optimizing the
mean number of transmitted photons per bit, yielding a
direct secure-communication rate of 66Mbit/s. Against
Eve’s optimum collective Gaussian attack with the same
100Mbit/s modulation rate, we obtained a peak SKE of
0.55bits per channel use, after optimizing the mean num-
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FIG. 3: Blue curve: Alice’s tap; Red curve: Bob’s tap without
Eve’s light injection; Green curve: Bob’s tap when Eve in-
jects all the light entering his terminal. Inset: measurements
of fE (red markers) under Eve’s active intrusion at different
injection fractions with error bars indicating ±1 standard de-
viation over 10 500-second measurements; and measurement
of fE (black marker) under Eve’s passive attack with an er-
ror bar indicating ±1 standard deviation over 30 500-second
measurements.
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FIG. 4: Information rates and efficiencies in Mbit/s (left ver-
tical axis) and bits per channel use (right vertical axis) versus
Alice’s mean number of transmitted photons per bit duration.
Green curve: Alice and Bob’s Shannon information; Black
curve: upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information for a passive
attack; Brown curve: upper bound on Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion for the optimum collective Gaussian attack; Blue curve:
SKR against a passive Eve; Grey curve: SKR against the op-
timum collective Gaussian attack; Dashed line: ultimate limit
on SKE in bits per channel use for a 10-dB-loss channel for
all single-mode-per-channel-use one-way QKD protocols [9].
ber of transmitted photons per channel bit, giving rise to
an SKR of 55Mbit/s. This SKE exceeds the ultimate
limit for all one-way single-mode-per-channel-use QKD
FIG. 3: (color online) Alice’s BER versus her mean number
of transmitted photons per bit duration for W = 2.2 THz
source bandwidth and R = 100 Mbit/s modulation over a
channel with 10 dB loss. Red circles: measured BER with
error bars indicating ±1 standard deviation of 10 consecu-
tive measurements. Solid (red) curve: predicted BER, in-
cluding all measured experimental imperfections (detailed in
Ref. [32]). Dashed (green) curve: quantum Chernoff bound on
Eve’s BER for her optimum passive individual attack. Inset:
50 bits of homodyne-receiver’s output (blue jagged curve) ver-
sus Bob’s modulated waveform (red square-wave) at a BER
level of 10−4, clearly showing the high signal-to-noise ratio of
Alice’s receiver.
certainty (other confidence levels are in Ref. [32]), we use
fUBE = 0.27% as an upper bound on Eve’s injection frac-
tion. We evaluate Alice a d Bob’s Shanno information
from the BER measurements, Eve’s Holevo-information
upper bound χUBE (f
UB
E ) for er optimum collective at-
tack, d χUBE (0) for her passive attack (see Ref. [32]).
In th s SKR estimation, we assume a β = 94% recon-
ciliation effici ncy [34]. For a passive attack with our
100 Mbi /s modulation rate, we optimize Alice’s mean
n mber of transmitt d photons per bit and obtain a p ak
direct secure-commu ication efficiency of 0.66 bits per
channel use, yielding a direct secure-communication rate
of 66 Mbit/s. Against Eve’s optimum collective attack
with the same 100 Mbit/s modulation rate, we obtain a
peak SKE of 0.55 bits per channel use, after optimizing
Alice’s mean number of transmitted photons per chan-
nel bit, giving rise to an SKR of 55 Mbit/s. This SKE
exceeds the ultimate limit for all one-way single-mode-
per-channel-use QKD protocols by 5.6 dB, see Fig. 5.
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated
high-rate FL-QKD using classical-state broadband light
augmented by a photon-pair source for channel monit r-
ing. Our experiment’s 55 Mbits/s SKR over a 10-dB-loss
channel in an asymptotic regime is a ∼50-fold improve-
ment over state-of-the-art QKD for the same channel at-
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width and R = 100Mbit/s modulation over a channel with
10 dB loss. Red circles: experimentally measured BER with
error bars indicating ±1 standard deviation of 10 consecutive
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all measured experimental imperfections (detailed in Methods
and Supplementary Information). Dashed green curve: quan-
tum Chernoff bound on Eve’s BER for her optimal passive
individual attack. Inset: 50 bits of homodyne-receiver’s out-
put (blue) versus Bob’s modulated waveform (red) at a BER
level of 10−4, clearly showing the high signal-to-noise ratio of
Alice’s homodyne receiver.
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by direct power measurements of Alice and Eve’s light
entering Bob’s terminal. The inset in Fig. 3 shows ex-
cellent agreement between the measured and actual fE
values.
To estimate the SKR, we shut down the active injec-
tion and measured fE = (0.07± 0.2)% from the channel
monitors. After adding one standard deviation of mea-
surement uncertainty (other confidence levels are in Sup-
plementary Information), we used fUBE = 0.27% as an
upper bound on Eve’s injection fraction. We evaluated
Alice and Bob’s Shannon information from the BERmea-
surements, and Eve’s Holevo-information upper bound
χUBE (f
UB
E ) for her optimum collective Gaussian attack,
and χUBE (0) for her passive attack (see Methods and Sup-
plementary Information). In this SKR estimation, we
employed a β = 94% reconciliation efficiency [24]. For
a passive attack with our 100Mbit/s modulation rate,
we estimated a peak direct secure-communication effi-
ciency of 0.66bits per channel use, after optimizing the
mean umber of transmitted photo s per bit, yielding a
direct secure-communication rate of 66Mbit/s. Against
Eve’s opti um collective Gaussian attack with the same
100Mbit/s modulation rate, we obtained a peak SKE of
0.55bits per channel use, after optimizing the mean num-
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FIG. 3: Blue curve: Alice’s tap; Red curve: Bob’s tap without
Eve’s light injection; Green curve: Bob’s tap when Eve in-
jects all the light entering his terminal. Inset: measurements
of fE (red markers) under Eve’s active intrusion at different
injection fractions with error bars indicating ±1 standard de-
viation over 10 500-second measurements; and measurement
of fE (black marker) under Eve’s passive attack with an er-
ror bar indicating ±1 standard deviation over 30 500-second
measurements.
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tical axis) and bits per channel use (right vertical axis) versus
Alice’s mean number of transmitted photons per bit duration.
Green curve: Alice and Bob’s Shannon information; Black
curve: upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information for a passive
attack; Brown curve: upper bound on Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion for the optimum collective Gaussian attack; Blue curve:
SKR against a passive Eve; Grey curve: SKR against the op-
timum collective Gaussian attack; Dashed line: ultimate limit
on SKE in bits per channel use for a 10-dB-loss channel for
all single-mode-per-channel-use one-way QKD protocols [9].
ber of transmitted photons per channel bit, giving rise to
an SKR of 55Mbit/s. This SKE exceeds the ultimate
limit for all one-way single-mode-per-channel-use QKD
FIG. 4: (color online) Photon-coincidence histogram of the
channel monitor. Top curve (blue): Alice’s tap; Bottom curve
(red): Bob’s tap without Eve’s light injection; Middle curve
(green): Bob’s tap when Eve injects all the light entering
his terminal. Inset: measurements of fE (red markers) un-
der Eve’s intrusion at different injection fractions with error
bars indicating ±1 standard deviation over ten 500-s measure-
ments; and measurement of fE (black marker) when there is
no actual injection with an error bar indicating ±1 standard
deviation over thirty 500-s measurements.
tenuation [4, 5], and our experiment’s SKE of 0.55 bits
per channel use is a ∼500-fold improvement over that
state-of-the-art system’s efficiency. A complete finite-size
analysis, as done in Refs. [4, 5], is part of our future study,
but we expect that FL-QKD’s high SKR would allow it
to approach the asymptotic limit in a few minutes.
While pursuing FL-QKD’s full security proof against
general coherent attacks, we have analyzed a class of
such attacks, including an intercept-and-resend attack
[24], and found FL-QKD secure owing to the number-
phase uncertainty principle [32]. From an experimental
perspective, we exp ct to substantially oo t FL-QKD’s
throughput by increasi g the modulation rate, optimiz-
ing the source brightness, and employing faster NbN
SNSPDs to reduce the integratio time needed for chan-
nel monito ing. Additionally, we plan to implement FL-
QKD with i stalled fibers and dispersion compe sation,
which we have already done in the current experiment
using dispersion-compensating components. With these
future developments, FL-QKD points to a viable route to
long-distance Gbit/s communication systems with certi-
fiable security. FL-QKD, like prevailing QKD protocols,
only allows point-to-point communication, so that ex-
tending the protocol to e able secure commun cation be-
tween distributed users in a network would be intr guing.
We thank Q. Zhao and A. McCaughan for valuable dis-
cussions about SNSPDs and E. Wong for generating the
50 200 400 600
0
20
40
60
80
100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Transmitted photons/bit
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ra
te
(Mbit
/s)
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
(bit/u
se
)
FIG. 5: (color online) Information rates and efficiencies in
Mbit/s (left axis) and bits per channel use (right axis) versus
Alice’s mean number of transmitted photons per bit duration.
Solid top curve (green): Alice and Bob’s Shannon informa-
tion; Solid middle curve (blue): SKR against a passive Eve;
Solid bottom curve (gray): SKR against the optimum collec-
tive attack; Dashed top curve (brown): upper bound on Eve’s
Holevo information for the optimum collective attack; Dashed
bottom curve (black): upper bound on Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion for a passive attack; Horizontal solid line: ultimate limit
on SKE in bits per channel use for a 10-dB-loss channel for
all single-mode-per-channel-use one-way QKD protocols [9].
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number N00014-14-1-0808.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Experimental details
A detailed block diagram of our FL-QKD experimental setup is shown in Fig. 6. In the experiment, the spontaneous
parametric down-converter (SPDC) is a non-degenerate type-0 phase-matched, MgO-doped, periodically-poled lithium
niobate (PPLN) crystal that is continuous-wave pumped at 780 nm with its output coupled into a single-mode fiber.
A coarse wavelength-division multiplexer (CWDM) separates the SPDC signal and idler into two flat-top 18-nm-wide
channels centered at 1550 nm and 1570 nm, respectively. The idler is detected immediately by a WSi superconducting
nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) with ∼80% detection efficiency and a counting rate of ∼2M counts/s in
an unsaturated regime. The SPDC signal is used as a probe for quantifying Eve’s active intrusion. The amplified
spontaneous emission (ASE) noise produced by an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) is filtered by a CWDM,
whose 18-nm-wide 1550 nm output channel provides the classical broadband light. The classical broadband light is
split by a 99:1 beam splitter: the 99% output serves as the LO for Alice’s homodyne receiver to be stored in a fiber
spool situated inside Alice’s terminal, and the 1% output is further attenuated by a tunable optical attenuator for
transmission to Bob.
The amplitude and phase of the ASE light for transmission are fine tuned using a WaveShaper (Finisar 1000S)
that offers two functionalities. First, the WaveShaper introduces a wavelength-dependent loss on the ASE light to
render its spectrum indistinguishable from the spectrum of the SPDC signal. Matching their spectra is critical for the
security of the protocol. Second, the WaveShaper applies a wavelength-dependent phase shift on the ASE light to fine
tune its dispersion property. In the experiment we find that the WaveShaper is particularly useful for compensating
high-order dispersion. The waveshaped ASE light is combined with the SPDC signal on a 98:2 beam splitter: 98%
of the SPDC signal and 2% of the waveshaped ASE light are sent to Bob. For Alice’s reference tap, this combined
ASE-SPDC light is tapped (< 0.1%, limited by the deadtime of the SNSPDs) for detection with a second WSi SNSPD,
and the rest of the ASE-SPDC light is sent to Bob. To simulate the channel loss induced by a 50-km fiber link, we
insert a 10 dB optical attenuator in the Alice-to-Bob channel. In the experiment, the tunable optical attenuator is
used to adjust the mean number of transmitted ASE photons per bit. At the operating point of ∼200 ASE photons
6Demonstration of Floodlight Quantum Key Distribution
Supplementary Information
Zheshen Zhang,∗ Quntao Zhuang, Franco N. C. Wong, and Jeffrey H. Shapiro
Research Laboratory of Electronics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA
(Dated: April 24, 2016)
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FIG. 1: Experimental schematic. Attn: attenuator; BERT: bit-error rate tester; BPSK: binary phase-shift keying; Coinc:
coincidence counting; CWDM: coarse wavelength-division multiplexer; EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; LO: local oscillator;
PPLN: periodically-poled lithium niobate; SNSPD: superconducting nanowire single-photon detector; SPDC: spontaneous
parametric down-converter.
A detailed block diagram of our FL-QKD experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. In the experiment, the spontaneous
parametric down-converter (SPDC) is a non-degenerate type-0 phase-matched, MgO-doped, periodically-poled lithium
niobate (PPLN) crystal that is continuous-wave pumped at 780 nm with its output coupled into a single-mode fiber.
A coarse wavelength-division multiplexer (CWDM) separates the SPDC signal and idler into two flat-top 16-nm-wide
channels centered at 1550 nm and 1570 nm, respectively. The idler is detected immediately by a WSi superconducting
nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) with ∼80% detection efficiency and a counting rate of ∼2M counts/s in
an unsaturated regime. The SPDC signal is used as a probe for quantifying Eve’s active intrusion. The amplified
spontaneous emission (ASE) noise produced by an erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) is filtered by a CWDM,
whose 16-nm-wide 1550 nm output channel provides the classical broadband light. The classical broadband light is
∗Electronic address: zszhang@mit.edu
FIG. 6: Experimental schematic. Attn: attenuator; BERT: bit-error rate tester; BPSK: binary phase-shift keying; Coinc:
coincidence counting; CWDM: coarse wavelength-division multiplexer; EDFA: erbium-doped fiber amplifier; LO: local oscillator;
PPLN: periodically-poled lithium niobate; SNSPD: superconducting nanowire single-photon detector; SPDC: spontaneous
parametric down-converter.
per bit, the SPDC signal constitutes <0.05% of the combined transmitted ASE-SPDC light.
At Bob’s terminal, we first employ a CWDM to reject all out-of-band light followed by a circulator to block all back
propagating light. We then t ke the pseudo-random output from a bit-error rate tester (BERT) to encode message
bits nto the CWDM-filtered light through a p ase modulator at 100-Mbit/s using bi ary phase-shift keying (BPSK).
The polarizer embedd d in the phase modulator blocks all unwanted polarization . To mo itor the channel, a small
portion (< 0.1%, limited by the deadtime of the SNSPDs) is ta ped and detected by a WSi SNSPD. We use an EDFA
ith a measured ∼7 dB weak-input noise figure to amplify and mask the encoded m ssage. A CWDM is installed
after the EDFA to reject all out-of-band ASE noise.
At Alice’s receiver, we build a free-space tunable delay line to match the propagation delays incurred by the LO and
the light that has undergone the Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice roundtrip. To compensate the dispersion in the fiber link, we
pass the LO through ∼3 m of dispersion-compensating fiber. The delay-matched LO and returned signal are mixed
on a 50:50 beam splitter prior to their input to a 75-MHz bandwidth balanced receiver (Thorlabs PDB-420C). To
compensate the phase drift arising from thermal and mechanical fluctuations, we implement a servo loop to lock the
relative phase between the LO and the returned signal. In the servo loop, a lock-in amplifier outputs a 5 kHz sinusoidal
dither that is superimposed on the BPSK modulation. At the balanced receiver, the high-frequency (BPSK modulation
rate) amplitude of the output signal is rectified with a power splitter followed by a radio-frequency double-balanced
mixer and then fed back to the lock-in amplifier to generate an error signal for the dither. A proportional-integral-
derivative controller processes the output of the lock-in amplifier and generates a phase-compensation signal to be
added to Bob’s phase modulator. The homodyne receiver’s output is electrically filtered and then either directed to
the BERT for bit-error rate (BER) measurement, or to a wide-band oscilloscope for waveform measurement.
To simulate Eve’s SPDC-injection attack, we add a 98:2 beam splitter (insertion loss included in κS) to the Alice-to-
Bob channel. We split off a small amount of ASE light from the LO, introduce a time delay and optical attenuation,
and inject the broadband light into Bob’s terminal through the 2% port of the beam splitter. In this way, Eve’s
injected light has the same spectrum as the light Alice sends to Bob, and a sufficiently long time delay ensures that
Eve’s injected light and the ASE light Alice sends are not correlated at Bob’s terminal.
7Security analysis
Detailed security analysis for FL-QKD has been presented in Ref. [24]. Here, we outline the essential components
of that analysis. In both her passive and optimum collective attacks, Eve replaces the lossy Alice-to-Bob fiber with
lossless fiber into which she has inserted a beam splitter, and, for analysis purposes, she is granted all photons in the
Bob-to-Alice channel. In her passive attack, Eve captures all photons at the output port of the beam splitter in the
Alice-to-Bob channel without injecting any light into that channel. In the SPDC-injection realization of her optimum
collective attack, Eve produces quadrature-entangled light from a SPDC and injects the SPDC signal through her
input port of the beam splitter in the Alice-to-Bob channel. We assume Eve has a perfect quantum memory to store
all captured photons as well as her SPDC idler. At Eve’s receiver, she either decodes each bit individually or performs
a collective measurement on all photons she possesses. In the individual attack, we use the quantum Chernoff bound
to quantify Eve’s optimal BER. Eve’s capability in the collective attack is quantified by an upper bound on her Holevo
information.
In a passive individual attack, the quantum Chernoff bound for Eve’s optimal discrimination strategy is given by
Pr(e)QCBE =
1
2
exp
[−4Mκ(1− κ)(1− κB)N2S] , (3)
where κ is the transmissivity of the Alice-to-Bob channel, κB is the device loss prior to the EDFA at Bob’s terminal,
and NS is Alice’s source brightness as measured at the beginning of the Alice-to-Bob channel.
Our lower bound on Alice and Bob’s secret-key rate against collective attacks is given by
∆RLBAB(fE) =
[
βIAB − χUBEB(fE)
]
R, (4)
where R is Bob’s modulation rate. Our experiment used R = 100 Mbit/s, and our secret-key rate calculation assumes
β = 0.94 [34]. In FL-QKD, Bob’s BPSK modulation leads to a binary signal from Alice’s homodyne measurement,
so that IAB is directly determined by Alice’s bit-error rate Pr(e)
hom
Alice:
IAB = 1 + Pr(e)
hom
Alice log2[Pr(e)
hom
Alice]
+ [1− Pr(e)homAlice] log2[1− Pr(e)homAlice]. (5)
Alice’s theoretical BER is calculated using Eq. (D8) of Ref. [24]’s Appendix D augmented by a parameter η < 1
that models experimental imperfections caused by residual dispersion and electronic-filter mismatch, and κB < 1
that models device losses in Bob’s terminal prior to his EDFA. Furthermore, κS in Eq. (D8) of Ref. [24]’s Appendix
D refers to the channel transmissivity seen by Alice and Bob, i.e., Bob’s received photon flux divided by Alice’s
transmitted photon flux. To relate κS to the actual channel transmissivity κ (determined by the loss induced by the
optical attenuator), we let κS in Eq. (D8) of Ref. [24]’s Appendix D be κ/(1− fE) and obtain
Pr(e)homAlice = Q
(√
2Mκη(1− κB)NSGB/NB
)
(6)
= Q
(√
2Mκη(1− κB)NS/γ
)
, (7)
where
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
dt
e−t
2/2
√
2pi
. (8)
In Eq. (6), NS is the source brightness, κ = 0.1 is the one-way transmissivity, M = 2.0× 104 is the number of modes
per bit, GB = 3.8 × 103 is the EDFA’s gain, NB = 9.7 × 103 photons/s-Hz is the brightness of the EDFA’s ASE
output, and η ∼ 0.9, κB = 0.71 are obtained by experimental calibration. The EDFA’s noise figure 10 log10(γ) + 3,
where γ ≡ NB/GB , was measured to be ∼7 dB with a weak-signal input. The source brightness is calculated using
NS =
P
~ω0W
, (9)
where P is the measured signal power at the output of Alice’s terminal, ~ω0 ≈ 1.28×10−19 J is the signal wavelength’s
photon energy, and W = M ×R = 2.2 THz (18 nm) is the signal bandwidth.
We next derive our upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information. We consider Eve’s optimum collective attack, in
which she employs a broadband SPDC source to produce quadrature-entangled signal and idler beams and uses a
8beam splitter to inject the signal light into Bob’s terminal. The spectra of Alice’s signal and the signal arm of Eve’s
SPDC source are well matched, because any out-of-band photons are filtered out by the CWDM that precedes Bob’s
EDFA. Our upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information rate is given by [24]
χUBEB(fE) = min
{
S
[
ρGaussE (fE)
]− 1
2
1∑
k=0
S
[
ρ
(k)
E (fE)
]
, 1
}
. (10)
Here: ρ
(k)
E is Eve’s conditional density operator—given the value, k, of Bob’s bit—for the light at her disposal. It is
an M -fold tensor product of zero-mean, 3-mode Gaussian states all with the same Wigner covariance matrix Λ
(k)(fE)
E ;
and ρGaussE (fE) is an M -fold tensor product of zero-mean, 3-mode Gaussian states all with the same Wigner covariance
matrix ΛE(fE) =
∑1
k=0Λ
(k)
E (fE)/2; and S(·) denotes von Neumann entropy.
Eve’s conditional von Neumann entropy satisfies
S
[
ρ
(k)
E (fE)
]
= MS
[
ρ
(k)
E (fE)
]
, (11)
where ρ
(k)
E is a zero-mean, three-mode Gaussian state with Wigner covariance function
Λ
(k)
E (fE) =
1
4

2NactAB(fE) + 1 0 −CactIA (fE) 0 (−1)kCactAB(fE) 0
0 2NactAB(fE) + 1 0 C
act
IA (fE) 0 (−1)kCactAB(fE)
−CactIA (fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 (−1)kCactIB (fE) 0
0 CactIA (fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 (−1)k+1CactIB (fE)
(−1)kCactAB(fE) 0 (−1)kCactIB (fE) 0 2NactBA(fE) + 1 0
0 (−1)kCactAB(fE) 0 (−1)k+1CactIB (fE) 0 2NactBA(fE) + 1

,(12)
where
NactAB(fE) = 〈eˆ(2)†Im eˆ
(2)
Im
〉 = (1− κ)NS + κNE(fE) (13)
CactIA (fE) = 〈eˆ(1)Im eˆ
(2)
Im
〉 = 2
√
κNE(fE)[NE(fE) + 1] (14)
CactAB(fE) = 〈eˆ(2)†Im aˆBm〉 = 2
√
GB(1− κB)κ(1− κ)[NS −NE(fE)] (15)
CactIB (fE) = 〈eˆ(1)Im aˆBm〉 = 2
√
GB(1− κB)(1− κ)NE(fE)[NE(fE) + 1] (16)
NactBA(fE) = 〈aˆ†Bm aˆBm〉 = GB(1− κB) [κNS + (1− κ)NE(fE)] +NB . (17)
In the preceding expressions: NactAB(fE) is the brightness of the light Eve tapped from the Alice-to-Bob channel;
NactBA(fE) is the brightness of the light in the Bob-to-Alice channel; NE(fE) is the brightness of Eve’s SPDC signal;
CactAB(fE) is the quadrature correlation between the light Eve tapped from the Alice-to-Bob channel and the light
in the Bob-to-Alice channel; CactIA (fE) is the quadrature correlation between the light Eve tapped from the Alice-to-
Bob channel and her idler; and CactIB (fE) is the quadrature correlation between the light in the Bob-to-Alice channel
and Eve’s idler. Equations (13)–(17) are obtained using the annihilation operators eˆ
(1)
Im
, eˆ
(2)
Im
, and aˆBm defined in
Eqs. (C58), (C59), and (A8) of Ref. [24]’s Appendices. The annihilation operator eˆ
(1)
Im
is associated with Eve’s m-th
locally-stored idler mode, eˆ
(2)
Im
is associated with the m-th mode Eve captures from the Alice-to-Bob channel, and
aˆBm is associated with the m-th returned signal mode from Bob. Alice and Bob’s channel monitoring provides a
calibration-free measurement of Eve’s injection fraction fE [24], from which they can compute the brightness of Eve’s
SPDC signal light as follows:
NE(fE) =
κNSfE
(1− κ)(1− fE) . (18)
9Eve’s unconditional Wigner covariance matrix is 6M × 6M block diagonal with 6× 6 identical blocks given by
ΛE(fE) =
1∑
k=0
Λ
(k)
E (fE)/2 = (19)
1
4

2NactAB(fE) + 1 0 −CactIA (fE) 0 0 0
0 2NactAB(fE) + 1 0 C
act
IA (fE) 0 0
−CactIA (fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 0 0
0 CactIA (fE) 0 2NE(fE) + 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 2NactBA(fE) + 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 2NactBA(fE) + 1

. (20)
With Λ
(k)
E (fE) and ΛE(fE) in hand, one can readily evaluate S
[
ρGaussE (fE)
]
and S
[
ρ
(k)
E (fE)
]
using symplectic
decomposition [35].
FL-QKD’s security analysis has so far been established against collective attacks in which Eve interacts individually
with each frequency mode but is allowed to perform an optimum joint measurement over all modes. A full security
proof against general coherent attack is under development, but this does not preclude us from analyzing FL-QKD’s
security against specific coherent attacks, one of which is the intercept-and-resend (I&R) attack. In such an attack,
Eve measures the timing of each photon from Alice and endeavors to elude the channel monitor by producing a
quantum signal that mimics the measured photon statistics. In doing so, Eve interacts coherently with all frequency
modes. I&R attacks have been given an appreciable amount of consideration in Ref. [24], and here let us formulate the
following I&R attack. Eve first takes the light from Alice, performs a quantum non-demolition (QND) photon-number
measurement on every temporal mode, and stores the output light from that measurement for use as a reference. To
elude the channel monitor, Eve needs to ensure that: (1) she sends a vacuum state |0〉 into Bob’s terminal when
the measured temporal mode contains no photon; and (2) she sends the Fock state |1〉 into Bob’s terminal when
the measured temporal mode contains a photon. This is Eve’s only strategy to stay undetected because violation
of the former increases the time-shifted coincidence rate C˜IB while violation of the latter reduces the time-aligned
coincidence rate CIB , either of which leads to fE 6= 0 being measured. At this juncture, let us consider the amount of
information Eve can acquire in either case. In the former case, a vacuum mode obviously carries no information. In
the latter case, |1〉’s phase is completely undefined because its photon number is well defined—a consequence of the
number-phase uncertainty principle [36]. In other words, phase modulation on |1〉 leaves the state unchanged, viz.
eiθ|1〉 = |1〉 insofar as any measurement on that state is concerned. Therefore, there does not exist a phase reference
for |1〉 that allows for effectively decoding of Bob’s phase modulation. We thus conclude that the I&R attack offers
Eve no information. The above argument is consistent with FL-QKD’s security analysis [24], which proves that fE = 0
indicates Eve’s gaining no information in her active attacks. Going one step forward, let us analyze how the I&R
attack affects Alice’s BER. First note that Eve’s QND timing measurements destroy the phase coherence between
her retained photons and Alice’s local oscillator. In addition, we learned that Eve is unable to decode Bob’s phase
modulation. Consequently, Eve’s encoding on the retained photons yields a 50% BER at Alice’s terminal, leaving her
I&R attack immediately detectable.
Secret-key rates at different confidence levels
In the Letter, the reported SKR of 55 Mbit/s is obtained by assuming that Eve’s injection fraction equals fUBE ,
the experimentally-determined injection fraction fE plus one measurement standard deviation (σ). SKRs at higher
confidence levels, i.e., adding more standard deviations to the experimental fE value, can also be derived. A key
feature of FL-QKD is that its SKR can be optimized over source brightness. So, we optimize SKR over source
brightness at 2σ, 3σ, 4σ, and 5σ confidence levels and obtain the results in Table 1. It is notable that the SKRs at
higher confidence levels do not degrade much by virtue of the optimization.
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Confidence level Secret-key rate
1σ 55 Mbit/s
2σ 49 Mbit/s
3σ 43 Mbit/s
4σ 38 Mbit/s
5σ 34 Mbit/s
TABLE I: SKRs at various confidence levels.
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